The most expensive political problems are not those that are solved incorrectly. Often, more expensive are those whose solution is delayed for decades.
The relationship between Serbia and Kosovo has over the past decades been viewed mainly through the prism of political status—territory, sovereignty, international recognition, and political negotiations. However, while the political debate has revolved around the final solution, less attention has been paid to the issue that has direct consequences for everyday life:
What is the cost of not resolving the situation?
The status quo did not represent the absence of a decision. On the contrary, it was a political choice that produces certain consequences and creates specific relations. Long-term uncertainty has left its mark on the economy, investments, infrastructure, demographic trends, and people's trust in institutions.
Societies that live in a state of political blockade for a long time pay the price. Capital has become more cautious, development projects slower, and the spaces for the growth and strengthening of various informal structures larger. Where institutions cannot provide stability—and in this case that was the state of Kosovo—or do not want to (the state of Serbia), space often opens up for those who profit from instability.
The status quo suited the regime in Serbia in order to:
- In the vacuum of non-resolution, Vučić's mafia regime was enabled to rule over the territory of northern Kosovo, economic flows, and the shadow economy, through the Serb List and criminals under his control,
- pulling patriotism ‘out of the drawer’ as needed, maintained constant interethnic tension which
It had the function of national homogenization and distraction from the real problems of Serbian society, which was sinking into authoritarianism.
A particular problem is the loss of time. Money can be recovered, infrastructure can be built, but lost years of life and progress are hard to get back. Generations that are growing up adopt uncertainty, tensions, and hatred toward members of another nation as a normal state.
Because of this, this issue cannot be viewed solely as a matter of territorial and political status and the economic consequences of failing to resolve that status, but above all as a matter of social development and the future of the people in Serbia and Kosovo who live with the consequences of political decisions. Therefore, the highest price of the status quo is not just what is visible—missed investments, slowed development, or political crises. The greatest price was the creation of societies accustomed to not solving problems, but maintaining them.
Regardless of the direction in which political processes develop further, one thing is already certain: society has already paid the price for the prolonged status quo. It is measured not only by lost investments or missed development opportunities that Western democracies were ready to support, but also by time, trust, and accordingly, opportunities that can no longer be recovered.
Therefore, the real question today is no longer just what the final political solution will look like, but what consequences the decades during which the unresolved status became a substitute for an actual development strategy will leave in the coming period.
Author: Dejan Novaković